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Strengthening the State
GREGORY H. FOX'
INTRODUCTION
International law has always relied on States for its implementation.
While international regulatory bodies have proliferated in recent years-in
some cases even acquiring the power to impose sanctions for non-
compliance-the actual fulfillment of international commitments has remained
with States. National legislatures, regulatory agencies, courts, and police
forces translate increasingly complex international obligations into desired
changes in behavior. International supervision, to the extent it exists, is
supervision of compliant (or non-compliant) activity by States.
With the explosion in multilateral treaty regimes since World War II, the
sheer number of international obligations to be implemented has increased
dramatically. The United Nations (UN) Secretary-General now acts as
depository for some 486 multilateral treaties, only thirty-three of which
.predate 1945.' Regional treaty regimes have also proliferated.2  This
expansion in treaty obligations has been qualitative as well as quantitative.
Recent instruments require States to alter law and practice in virtually every
area of governance: from the environment, to criminal justice, to all manner
of health and safety regulations potentially creating non-tariff barriers to
trade.' In some cases, these new obligations complement States' existing
* Assistant Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law. B.A., Bates College, J.D., New
York University School of Law.
1. See UN Treaty Collection-Overview (visited Oct. 18, 1999) <http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/
overview.html>.
2. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, CHART OF SIGNATURES AND RATIFICATIONS OF EUROPEAN TREATIES
(1999); COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, CONSOLIDATED TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS (1991); and ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM: A
COMPARISON OF THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATIES 1947-1997, (visited Oct. 27, 1999)
<http://www.oas.org/en/progljuridico/english/Graphi.htm>.
3. For example, Chayes and Chayes describe a recent environmental instrument as requiring
"detailed administrative regulations and vigorous enforcement efforts. In essence, the state will have to
establish and enforce a full-blown domestic regime designed to secure the necessary reduction in
emissions." ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THENEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 14 (1995).
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regulatory institutions.4 In other cases, those institutions must be created out
of whole cloth. In both instances, the international community continues to
look, first and foremost, to State institutions for implementation of
international law.
The increasingly burdensome nature of international law seems clear
enough.' One would expect that faced with this phenomenon, international
lawyers would turn their attention to asking whether national institutions are
up to the task. Can national governments, especially those in developing
countries, cope with their new treaty obligations? If so, then the traditional
role of States as implementing agents of international norms would appear to
have made a successful transition to the modern era of international regulatory
regimes. If not, then one would expect scholars to suggest alternative
approaches to implementation, perhaps involving actors from the global,
regional, or sub-State level. The question might also be answered by
exploring whether compliance might be enhanced by certain domestic
reforms. Harold Koh's suggestion that familiarity with international
obligations be spearheaded by national courts is one example of this
approach.6
An important literature on compliance control has indeed emerged in the
past decade." But there is a more prominent literature that appears to begin
with a premise wholly at odds with the burdens now imposed by international
4. The United States, for example, in explaining its "declaration" that the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights is not to be a self-executing treaty, has argued that the rights set out in the
Covenant are already protected by existing legislation. See Observations by the United States of America
on General Comment No. 24 (52), reprinted in 16 HUM. RTS L.J. 52, 53 (1995).
5. See, e.g., Paul C. Szasz, General Law-Making Processes, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 27,28 (Christopher C. Joyner ed., 1997) ("[AIII types of international law, especially
treaty law, are being created at an ever-increasing rate-indeed at a rate that sometimes seems to exceed the
capacity of the international community (and especially of its newer and less well-equipped members) to
absorb and digest all the new norms.").
6. See Harold H. Koh, Why do Nations Obey International Law? 106 YALE L J. 2599 (1997).
7. For examples, see ADMINISTRATIVE AND EXPERT MONITORING OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES (Paul
C. Szasz ed., 1999); ELEONORE KOKOTsIs, KEEPING INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS: COMPLIANCE,
CREDIBILITY AND THE G-7, 1988-1995 (1999); TREATY COMPLIANCE: SOME CONCERNS AND REMEDIES
(Canadian Council on International Law & the Markland Group eds., 1998); ENGAGING COUNTRIES:
STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS (Edith Brown Weiss &
Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1998); COMPLIANCE WITH JUDGMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS (M.K.
Bulterman & M. Kuijer eds., 1996); INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS (Thomas M.
Franck & Gregory H. Fox eds., 1996); ENFORCING ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS: ECONOMIC MECHANISMS
AS VIABLE MEANS? (Rtldiger Wolfrum ed., 1996); CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 3; COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold Jacobson eds., 1995);
EFFECTING COMPLIANCE (Hazel Fox & Michael A. Mayer eds., 1993); THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER
OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990).
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treaty regimes. This literature proclaims the marginalization of the sovereign
State. In this Essay, I examine, and ultimately contest, the implications of this
literature for the new international regulatory regimes.
The State marginalization literature takes various forms and frequently
reaches conclusions about the changing juridical status of States based largely
on analyses of non-legal phenomena.' These phenomena include the rapid
changes in global communications, expansion of securities, capital and
currency markets, the emergence of a cosmopolitan ethic on questions of
human rights, and, somewhat differently, the rise in the 1990s of sub-State
identity movements that challenge State authority from below. In light of
these phenomena, writers claim, the broad legal prerogatives once enjoyed by
national governments have slowly been ceded to an array of global and
regional organizations. In many areas, international adjudicatory bodies, and
not national courts, hold ultimate authority to determine whether domestic
laws are compatible with treaty obligations.9 The creation of international
law, once a matter of decentralized custom, is now frequently carried out by
multilateral bodies staffed by international civil servants. At those lawmaking
conferences, State delegates are often in the minority, outnumbered by
representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), transnational
corporations, and other actors in a growing "international civil society."
If this description of an increasingly marginalized State is accurate, how
can that idea be reconciled with the burdensome and now pervasive demands
of new international legal regimes? Stated another way, how can international
8. This literature is now vast. A comprehensive collection of sources, mostly from non-legal
perspectives, appears in MICHAEL Ross FOWLER & JULIA MARIE BUNCK, LAW, POWER, AND THE
SOVEREIGN STATE 1-3 (1995). International legal scholarship includes: L. ALl KHAN, THE EXTINCTION
OFNATION-STATES (1996); John A. Perkins, The Changing Foundations of International Law: From State
Consent to State Reponsibility, 15 B.U. INT'L L.J. 433 (1997); Celia R. Taylor, A Modest Proposal:
Statehood and Sovereignty in a Global Age, 18 U. PA. J. ECON. INT'L L. 745 (1997); Oscar Schachter,
Decline of the Nation-State and its Implications for International Law, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT' L. 7
(1997); Symposium, The Decline of the Nation-State and Its Effects on Constitutional and International
Economic Law, 18 CAPDOZO L. REV. 903 (1996); Symposium, Conference on Changing Notions of
Sovereignty and the Role of Private Actors in International Law, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y I (1993);
Neil McCormick, Beyond the Sovereign State, 56 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1993); Christoph Schreuer, The
Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigm for International Law, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 447
(1993).
9. For example, after describing the World Trade Organization's system ofdispute resolution, Phillip
Trimble concludes that "[t]he resulting practical devolution of decisionmaking authority to international
institutions is the essence of the loss of national sovereignty." See Phillip R. Trimble, Globalization,
International Institutions, and the Erosion of National Sovereignty and Democracy, 95 MICH. L. REV.
1944, 1944-45 (1997) (reviewing THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INSTITUTIONS (1995)).
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law ask States to assume a complex web of legal obligations while, at the
same time, working to diminish their authority? States cannot be both
marginal to the new international legal order and central to its success.
One could attempt to resolve this dilemma in a variety of ways. One
might conclude that the architects of the new regulatory regimes have simply
overestimated the States' capacity for implementation. On this view, much of
the recent international law will produce only marginal changes in State
behavior. Alternatively, one might conclude that the State marginalization
literature is simply wrong: States retain, if not the full capacity for
compliance, then at least a realistic potential to comply with most of their
international legal obligations most ofthe time. Yet another conclusion would
be to reject the idea of a zero-sum trade-off between national and global
institutions, and to argue that other sorts of actors (e.g., NGOs) will take up
implementation responsibilities that are beyond the capabilities of many State
governments.'°
An entirely different approach would be to suggest that there is really no
contradiction between State marginalization and the growth in international
obligations. One could argue that while the two phenomena employ similar
terminology, they are conceptually quite different. One might say that recent
international law only expects State institutions to function efficiently. A
ministry of the environment, for example, must have sufficient legal authority
and resources to implement obligations under an anti-pollution treaty. This
is not the same, however, as saying that the source of legal obligation for
environmental questions under regulation has remained with the State.
Obviously, an international treaty owes its existence in the first instance to
State consent. But the phenomenon of State marginalization in areas such as
the environment, one might argue, concerns only the relinquishment of
plenary authority to prescribe environmental norms applicable within State
borders. Thomas Franck has described this authority as "the power of the
final cut."" Thus, while State marginalization involves a change in the locus
of decision-making authority (increasingly vested in multilateral institutions),
the new international law does not speak to responsibility for carrying out
authoritative decisions (still vested in States). If these two functions are
thereby seen as complementary, then on this view, the State would retain
10. See The Challenge of Non-State Actors, 92 ASIL PROC. 20 (1998).
II. Thomas M. Frank, Statement of Analytical Approach of the Conference (Feb. 27, 1998) (paper
presented at Delegating Sovereignty Conference of International and Constitutional Law Experts)
(manuscript on file with author).
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much of its juridical distinctiveness and independence of function. Its
implementing responsibilities would be uncompromised by cessions of
prescriptive authority to international bodies.
In the discussion that follows, I suggest that none of these responses to the
dilemma adequately accounts for trends in contemporary international law.
The alternative I present is complex, for it involves changes in relations
between States and international law that not only straddle the tasks of
normative prescription and practical implementation, but also address broad
historical forces that transcend the narrow question of States' capacities to
fulfill treaty commitments. What I suggest is that normative prescription and
State implementation are now both concerns of international law. The latter
development is new, and its ascent into normativity is the phenomenon that
speaks most directly to claims of State marginalization. I argue that the
coherent and efficient functioning of national governing institutions has
become a central concern of international law. Treaty norms, and a broad
body of State practice, are now directed at strengthening States' capacities to
function as cohesive and robust political communities. Far from
marginalizing States, the objective is to produce States that are more than
juridical constructs or mere territorial enclosures with the bare bones of a
collective identity. Rather, the goal is to create State institutions that are
perceived as legitimate and, as such, conducive to their citizens' obedience.
These institutions will allow States to be more effective participants in the
international legal community, strengthening their ability to implement treaty
obligations.
These efforts have taken place largely, if not exclusively, in the
developing world. This is true for the simple reason that concern over the
effectiveness of governing bodies is most acute in developing States. Political
scientists have long detailed the adverse consequences of weak States
(particularly in Africa) for industrialization, the maintenance of domestic
order, and the observance of human rights. Many developed States, by
contrast, especially in Europe, are vigorous participants in international
regimes that build on the strength of governing institutions within their
Member States. This is not to say that developed States always (or even
mostly) adhere to their international obligations and that developing States do
not. The argument here concerns the capacity for participation rather than the
willingness to participate. As discussed below, the question of capacity
relating to legitimate governing institutions is quite different from the
question of capacity relating to resources.
1999]
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How does an effort to strengthen the State affect the traditional role of
international law as the source or promulgator of norms, and States as the
implementing agents of those norms? In other words, is strengthening the
State as an "implementing agent" really incompatible with claims that the
State is being marginalized? There are several reasons to believe that it is.
First, efforts to strengthen the State have made the effectiveness of national
governance itself an area of profound interest to the international legal
community. To view the implementing bodies of national government as
bereft of international normativity is to ignore this pervasive intrusion of
international law into matters of domestic governance.
Second, this process of institution-building enhances States' capacity to
participate in the creation and interpretation of international norms. Robust
international institutions, experience suggests, are built on robust national
institutions. Thus, efforts to strengthen the State initiate a process of mutual
reinforcement: international organizations work to assist national institutions;
resilient national governments participate more effectively and actively in the
work of international organizations; and the decisions of international
organizations, in turn, more accurately reflect the interests of those States.
The decisions of those organizations thereby achieve a broader legitimacy.
Absent significant political obstacles (a substantial caveat to be sure), a
greater congruence of interests between the institutions of international law
and previously marginalized States will thereby develop. This process of
convergence, however, is too complex to be described accurately using the old
categories of normative prescriber and implementing agent.
Third, strengthening States not only affects institutions of national
government but also the situation of individuals within those States. Some
scholars writing about the transformation of the State speak of an evolution
in individual personal identities brought about by the intrusion of
globalization into everyday life. Thomas Franck has described an emerging
flexibility in personal identifications that portends a "newly assertive global
claim to personal self-determination, a growing trend toward autochthonous
self-identification, an opening up of yet-unbroached possibilities of layered
and textured loyalties."' 2 As we will see, one of the weaknesses exhibited by
many developing States is the lack of a strong sense of affinity between citizen
and State. Loyalties are more often felt to ethnicity, religion, or region.
Institutions of government to which people feel no sense of obligation will
12. Thomas M. Franck, Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and Community in Law and Practice,
90 AM. J. INT'L L. 359, 382 (1996).
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only succeed through coercion, and the track record of such regimes is not
exemplary. Efforts to legitimize State institutions in the eyes of citizens seek
to foster this missing sense of affinity. The point for present purposes is that
such a transformation in personal identities is both, on the one hand, a
normative goal of international society realized through the vehicle of
international law and, on the other hand, an essential component of effective
implementation strategies. A simple dichotomy between the two cannot
account for this phenomenon.
What emerges, then, is not the traditional division of labor between
normative prescription and implementation, but an extraordinary convergence
of overlapping and complementary imperatives all subject to norms of
international law. In this Essay, I sketch out the many sources, goals,
justifications, and assumptions of international efforts to strengthen the State
in the developing world. The Essay will indeed be in the nature of a sketch,
a preliminary attempt to analyze the structure of a complex phenomenon.
However, I hope to make clear in very general terms the arguments available
to respond to the broadest claims of the State marginalization literature.
I
My arguments take the form of five propositions. The first is that claims
of State marginalization overlook important differences in how international
law and organizations have affected societies in the developed and developing
worlds. In the developed world-particularly in Europe-international law
emerged in response to the needs of political societies becoming increasingly
secular and centralized. 3 Efficient local administration, clear demarcations
of jurisdiction for new legal systems, and eventually, in the nineteenth
century, widespread divisions between peoples claiming distinct national
identities, all required protection against external encroachments.
International law protected the autonomy of national institutions, albeit in
varying degrees over time. Principles of national jurisdiction formed around
the principle of territoriality: "A state was entitled to exercise prescriptive
jurisdiction regarding any conduct within its territory; conversely, a state
could not exercise jurisdiction over conduct occurring outside of its
13. See generally ANTHONY D. SMITH, THE ETHNIC ORIGINS OF NATIONS (1986); David P. Calico,
Reflections on the Idea of the Nation-State, in NATIONALISM AND NATIONALITIES IN THE NEW EUROPE 15
(Charles A. Kupchan ed., 1995).
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boundaries, except with the regard to its own nationals."' 14 International law
itself contained virtually no standards governing a State's conduct within its
own territory.' International law functioned much like a protective tariff
wall, allowing indigenous political structures to mature, take root, and assert
their authority throughout the territory. 6 Michael Walzer argues that such
enclosure was in fact essential to the emergence of rights-based political
cultures: "Communal life and liberty requires the existence of 'relatively self-
enclosed arenas of political development.' Break into the enclosures and you
destroy the communities."' 7 The great theorists of State consolidation, such
as Thomas Hobbes and Jean Bodin, wrote of domestic absolutism as a
necessary response to conditions of pervasive disorder; the English civil war
in the case of Hobbes and the continental religious wars for Bodin.' It is little
exaggeration to say that the modern juridical State sanctified this
consolidation of power in early modern Europe. The new secular
international legal order was thus inseparable from the consolidation of
political power within defined territories.
What did this consolidation entail? First and foremost, it involved the
creation of autonomous constitutional orders within national territories.19
Political and legal structures emerged that reflected traditions of the societies
in which they were promulgated. External controls from non-State actors
(e.g., the Pope and Holy Roman Emperor) were cast off, and a process of
administrative consolidation laid the foundation for national systems of law.
The international juridical concept of the State was understood to serve the
14. David J. Gerber, Beyond Balancing: International Lm Restraints on the Reach of National
Laws, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 185, 194 (1984).
15. See Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather
Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1982). The one important exception concerned the treatment of aliens,
but because injuries to foreigners were understood as injuries to those individuals' States of nationality, this
exception was consistent with principles of territoriality. See Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 14
(1990).
16. Territoriality is still the default principle in questions of nationaljurisdiction, although it has been
substantially (some might say wholly) compromised by international norms addressing "domestic matters."
As the Permanent Court stated in the Lotus case, "the first and foremost restriction imposed by international
law upon a State is that-failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary-it may not exercise its
power in any form in the territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial ..
S. S. "Lotus," (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., (set. A), No. 10, at 18.
17. Michael Walzer, The Moral Standing of States, 9 PHIL.& PUB. AFF. 209,228 (1980).
18. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Richard Tuck ed., 1991) (1651); JEAN BODIN, ON
SOVEREIGNTY: FOUR CHAPTERS FROM THE SIX BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH (Julian H. Franklin trans.
& ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1992) (1576). See also ALAN JAMES, SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD: THE BASIS
OFINTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 4 (1986); MATTHEW H. KRAMER, HOBBES ANDTHEPARADOXES OF POLITICAL
ORIGINS 67-68 (1997).
19. See JAMES, supra note 18, at 30.
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express purpose of allowing domestic institutions to flourish without external
interference.2" These institutions not only developed substantive legal
principles, but also demarcated the legitimate exercise of political power. As
a result, "norms for selecting political leadership, assimilated through a long
process of socialization and institutionalization, tend to be taken for granted
by participants."'" Additionally, the levying of taxes and the conscription of
soldiers for purposes of waging war allowed "the nationalist ideals proclaimed
by the new political elites" to serve as "justifications for the conduct of
traditional power politics."22 The constitutional authority to conscript and tax
domestically served to reinforce and consolidate the independence of the State
internationally.
Second, consolidation allowed a process of cultural homogenization to
take place. It is now a commonplace in the literature of nationalism that the
State as a cultural community was a deliberate work in progress, one largely
fashioned by elites and realized through vehicles such as language, historical
myth-making, and national symbols.2" Most States, as Hobsbawm points out,
"differ in size, scale and nature from the actual communities with which most
human beings have identified over most ofh istory." '24 Considerable effort was
required to reorient these local identities to the new national levels. This
deliberate process of nation-building-of constructing new personal identities
to coincide with the new territorial States-was essential if States were to
function as coherent political units.2" This nationalist project was naturally
aided by-indeed, intertwined with-a juridical conception of the State that
allowed common cultures to emerge without interference from outside.
One may even go further and say that this grounding of political
communities in nationalist myths necessitated an international law fiercely
protective of State territory. Once the medieval notion of territory as the
personal province of a monarch gave way to, and was replaced by, a State with
20. David L. Blaney & Naeem Inayatullah, The Third World and a Problem ivith Borders, in
PERSPECTIVES ON THIRD-WORLD SOVEREIGNTY 83, 87 (Mark E. Denham & Mark Owen Lombardi eds.,
1996) ("[T]he hallmark of the appearance of the state is the centralization of rule, the replacement of
segmentary authority by a unitary and supreme political hierarchy, giving form to a political community.").
21. TRi Q. NGUYEN, THIRD-WORLD DEVELOPMENT: ASPECTS OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY AND
VIABILITY 31 (1989).
22. GIANFRANCO POGGi, THE STATE: ITS NATURE, DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPECTS 67 (1990).
23. See generally E.J. HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780 (1990).
24. Id. at 46.
25. See Jtrgen Habermas, The European Nation State. Its Achievements and Its Limitations. On the
past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship, 9 RATIO JURIS 125, 127 (1996). For example, Hobsbawm
notes that in 1789 only 50/6 of Frenchmen spoke French and that at the time of the Italian unification in
1860 only 2 V2% of citizens used Italian for everyday purposes. HOBSBAWM, supra note 23, at 60-61.
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a legal existence separate from its ruler, there was every incentive to protect
the central attribute of the State's new juridical personality: a defined
territory over which it exercised plenary control. International law, therefore,
began to develop rules governing interactions between these fictional entities.
The law of recognition, for example, did not exist prior to the middle of the
eighteenth century, but quickly developed once States were understood as
possessing autonomous personalities.26 Thus, States became both the sole
creators and subjects of international law.
Third, and relatedly, territorial consolidation allowed States to become the
focal points of activity by citizenries increasingly involved in political life.
The identification of territory with nationalist myths, flowing from attributes
of "the people," necessitated a more central role for inhabitants of the territory
in the national political consciousness. There was simply no need for such a
broadening of the political class when territories were identified with
individual monarchs. As Habermas observes, "[t]hose who had been
subjected to a more or less authoritarian rule, now gained step by step the
status of citizens. Nationalism stimulated this move from the status of private
subjects to citizenship."27 With the rise of theories of popular sovereignty in
the late eighteenth century, the legal prerogatives accorded the entity giving
citizenship its essential meaning-the juridical State-only increased. If the
State had become the embodiment of particular nationalist mythologies, then
the distinctiveness of each State required protection:
The importance of the idea of popular sovereignty in this
context was that it gave the cultural, ethnic and historical
communities with which people could identify, and around
which they could be mobilised, a political salience they had
not previously enjoyed ... Paradoxically, therefore, because
of the historical diversity of peoples, the universalistic idea
of popular sovereignty produced a highly particularistic
outcome in the form of nationalism, with profound
consequences for the spatial reorganisation of states.2"
International law was thus very much in service of the State-building
project, allowing the individual identities of European States to unfold at a
26. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 10-11 (1979).
27. Habermas, supra note 25, at 129.
28. DAVID BEETHAM, THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER 132-33 (1991).
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pace dictated by domestic politics.29 International lawyers in the nineteenth
century, the apogee of legal protection for nationalist undertakings, referred
frequently to the coherent, almost sentient character of juridical States.3°
Woolsey described the State as "a moral person;"'" Hall wrote of "the will of
an independent community within the territory occupied by it."32  This
conception of each State as possessing a unique national character, protected
by international law, had profound implications for the creation of new
international norms. The positivist insistence on State consent as the basis for
international law created a theoretically egalitarian procedure for creating new
norms, one that recognized each State's equal entitlement to accept or reject
emerging doctrines.33 This sense of equal entitlement to consent, in turn,
reinforced the legitimacy of national legal systems-the means by which State
consent was made manifest.34 Protecting the national legal sphere and an
increasingly egalitarian lawmaking process were, thus, two sides of the same
positivist coin. In the Island of Palmas case, Max Huber wrote of
international law having "established this principle of the exclusive
competence of the state in regard to its own territory in such a way as to make
it the point of departure in settling most questions that concern international
relations.""
This entwining of administrative control over territory, with normative
conceptions of a right to such control is well captured in Jackson and
Rosenberg's distinction between the "empirical" and "juridical" State. The
empirical State focuses on defacto authority, following Max Weber's well-
known definition of a State as a "corporate group that has a monopoly of force
over a territory and its population, including 'all action taking place in the area
29. Christian Tomuschat has identified an intermediate step-the State as a "societal phenomenon."
This iteration, he argues, "predates the creation of the international legal order since as a power centre it
existed before factual relationships turned into legal positions and entitlements." Christian Tomuschat,
Obligations Arising for States Without or Against Their Will, 241 RECUEIL DES COpS 210 (1993).
30. FERNANDO R. TES6N, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY
53-76 (1988).
31. THEODORE D. WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 37 (5th rev. ed.
1879) (1998).
32. WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 56 (4th ed. 1895).
33. For an analysis of how asymmetrical State power actually shapes the formation of customary law,
see MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES (1999).
34. See MORTON A. KAPLAN & NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 64-67 (1961).
35. Island of Palmas Arbitration (Neth. v. U.S.), 4 AM. J. INT'L L. 867, 875 (1928).
1999]
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of its jurisdiction."' 36 Thejuridical State is the fictional entity created through
international law, capable of asserting rights and bearing obligations. While
it is a matter of some historical complexity as to whether the empirical or
juridical State emerged first in Europe, it is clear that each was essential to the
success of the other. Most importantly, when a State was recognized as
having juridical personality in international law, it was assumed that the
empirical aspects of Statehood were present. Indeed, the legal criterion of an
effective government is itself an empirical question." James Crawford
regards effective government as the single most important legal criterion of
Statehood because "[t]erritorial sovereignty is not ownership of, but governing
power with respect to, territory. 38
The coincidence of juridical and empirical Statehood is critical to a
discussion of State marginalization in the developing world. This coincidence
embodies a central assumption of European-based international law to which
developing States became subject upon gaining their independence: that
States have the legal capacity to carry out obligations imposed through
international law. This is not an assumption that all States have equal
resources to implement their international law obligations, or that those
obligations are assumed with equal enthusiasm. It is rather the quite
minimalist view that the various organs of government exert authority over the
State's entire territory and are capable of implementing decisions of the
central authorities, whatever those decisions may be.
Several doctrines of international law are indeed substantively premised
on the existence of functional domestic institutions. Three examples of these
doctrines are: denial ofjustice to aliens,39 the principles of attribution in the
law of State responsibility,"' and the obligation to provide a remedy for
36. Robert H. Jackson & Carl G. Rosberg, Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the
Juridical in Statehood, 35 WORLD POL. 1, 2 (1982) (quoting MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 156 (Talcott Parsons ed., 1964)).
37. The existence of an effective government is one of the traditional indiciaof Statehood. Theothers
are: (I) a defined territory; (2) a permanent population; and (3) the capacity to enter into relations with
other States. See Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (Montevideo Convention), Dec. 26, 1933,
art. 1, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.
38. CRAWFORD, supra note 26, at 42.
39. The Harvard Research draft provided that a State is responsible for the denial ofjustice to an alien
where "there is a denial, unwarranted delay or obstruction of access to courts, gross deficiency in the
administration of judicial or remedial processes, failure to provide those guarantees which are generally
considered indispensable to the proper administration of justice, or a manifestly unjust judgment.'
Research on International Law Under the Auspices of Harvard Lm School, art. 9, reprinted in 23 AM.
J. INT'L L. 173 (Spec. Supp. 1929).
40. The International Law Commission has explained that international law presupposes "the existence
of rules of internal law which determine the position of the various organs in the State machinery proper
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violations of human rights.4 ' Debate raged among international lawyers in the
nineteenth century as to whether States whose institutions were only
minimally functional-often less felicitously described as lacking "common
standards ofcivilization"-should benefit from full juridical equality.4 While
the United Nations Charter effectively ended this debate by proclaiming the
juridical equality of all Member States,43 it nonetheless specified that States
wishing to join the United Nations must be "able" to carry out the obligations
set out in the Charter."
While the assumption of effective governance underlay the edifice of
international law emerging from Europe, it cannot be applied with any
confidence to the developing world. Unlike the States of Europe, developing
States generally did not benefit from an international law that enveloped their
territories in a protective cocoon during their formative periods of
consolidation. Thus, the European experience of assimilating particular
cultures to juridically significant territories was largely absent. Instead, any
formative period was skipped and the boundaries of developing States have
or in the machinery of the other entities which share with the State the exercise of elements on the
governmental authority." The International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility,
[197512 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 51, 61.
41. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides in Article 8 that "everyone has the right to
an effective remedy by the competent national tribunal, for acts violating the fundamental rights guaranteed
him by the constitution or by law." G.A. Res. 217A (1948). This right is repeated in all major human
rights treaties. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1966, arts. 2(3)(a) & (b),
18(2), 999 U.N.T.S. 171; European Convention on Human Rights; American Convention on Human
Rights, art. 25(l); African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 7(l)(a). In the Vellisquez Rodriguez
Case, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights held that a State Party "has a legal duty to take reasonable
steps to prevent human rights violations committed within its jurisdiction." This duty, it continued,
"includes all those means of a legal, political, administrative and cultural nature that promote the protection
of human rights." Velhsquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct.of H. R. 91, 155, I/A Court H.R. Ser C. no.
4(1988). See generally THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY
LAW 136-245 (1989).
42. See generally EDWIN D. DICKENSON, THE EQUALITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 223-36
(1920). A typical statement of the anti-equality view appears in the writings of an Italian commentator:
A state which does not find itself in a position to fulfil its international duties
towards other states, either as a result of traditional prejudices, or its internal
organization, or its customs and its religious beliefs, can only demand the full
enjoyment of international rights in perfect equality on condition that it change its
internal organization so as to enable it to fulfil its international duties by giving
substantial guaranties on this subject.
I Pasquale Fiore, Trattato di diritto internazionale pubblico §§425-427, at 291 (4th ed. 1904-16), quoted
in DICKENSON, supra, at 224.
43. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. I.
44. Id. art. 4, para. 2.
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generally been those drawn by colonial authorities. 5 This rush to juridical
Statehood was not, one must add, a dynamic opposed by elites in the
developing world. The General Assembly's 1960 Declaration on the Granting
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) has described as "the basis for the process of
decolonization," specifically renounced empirical Statehood as a prerequisite
to juridical Statehood, declaring that "inadequacy of political, economic or
educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying
independence."4"
Skipping the European process of consolidation might not have presented
a problem for the new developing States if their borders had borne a rational
relationship to the political communities they enclosed. But by and large they
did not."8 Judge Ajibola described the nature of border-drawing by colonial
officials in his separate opinion in the Chad/Libya case:
The colonial penchant for geometric lines (as exemplified by
Lord Salisbury's 'horseshoe'-shaped Tripolitarian
hinterland), has left Africa with a high concentration of states
where frontiers are drawn with little or no consideration for
those factors of geography, ethnicity, economic convenience
or reasonable means of communication that have played a
part in boundary determinations elsewhere. 9
The original irrationality of colonial borders was compounded by the
colonial powers' frequent reconfigurations of their administrative
subdivisions. This occurred in Afrique Occidentale Frangaise, Afrique
Equatoriale Frangaise, the mandated territories formerly under German rule,
and in Italian East Africa."
45. See ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES 191 (1995); Steven R. Ratner,
Drmving a Better Line: Uti Pessidetis and the Borders of New States, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 590, 595-96
(1996).
46. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J 12, 32 (Jan. 13).
47. G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR 94th Session, at 4 (1960).
48. See generally Malcolm Shaw, The Heritage of States: The Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris
Today, 67 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 75 (1996); Makau wa Mutua, Why Redrav the Map of Africa: A Moral and
Legal Inquiry, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1113 (1995).
49. Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 1, 49, 50-51 (separate opinion
of Judge Ajibola).
50. See Crawford Young, Self-Determination, Territorial Integrity and the African State System, in
CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA 320, 330-32 (Francis M. Deng & 1. William Zartman eds., 1991).
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This resulted in States that are remarkably heterogeneous in ethnicity,
language, and religion. While the anti-colonial movements of the immediate
post-war era often described the rights of colonial subjects using the rhetoric
of nationalism-an effort that sometimes continued into the early years of
independence5 l-there was rarely a common cultural heritage to serve as a
foundation for national politics throughout the entire territory.5 -  The
populations of most new African States "had not been together in one State
long enough to begin to amalgamate and assimilate." 3 Consider, for example,
the lack of "fit" between indigenous institutions and the new independent
State of Burma:
The new Republic of the Union of Burma which came into
being on 4 January 1948 bore little resemblance to any nation
or state from the historic past. The power and authority of
the Burmese kings and the central courts at Ava and
Mandalay had been destroyed. The economic hub and the
political centre had moved to Rangoon . . . And the
institutions of political power bequeathed to the new nation
were an ill-fitting suit of clothes modeled on the loose pattern
of British parliamentary democracy.54
Developing States thus conformed to the prevailing juridical model of
Statehood-essential for participation in the international community-but
without the concomitant histories of empirical communities. 5 This is not a
deterministic argument that ethnic heterogeneity automatically produces a
non-functional State. Certainly, developing States began life with a host of
5I. See Marina Ottoway, Ethnic Politics in Africa: Change and Continuity, in STATE, CONFLICT AND
DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA 299, 302-05 (Richard Joseph ed., 1999).
52. Richard Joseph, The Reconfiguration of Power in Late Twentieth-Century Africa, in STATE,
CONFLICT AND DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA, supra note 51, at 58 [hereinafter Joseph, Reconfiguration].
53. Marina Ottaway, Nation Building and State Disintegration, in STATE BUILDING AND
DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA: FAITH, HOPE, AND REALITIES 83,84 (Kidane Mengisteab & Cyril Daddieh
eds., 1999)
54. Amy L. Chua, The Privatization-Nationalization Cycle: The Link Between Markets and Ethnicity
in Developing Countries, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 267 (1995) (quoting MARTIN SMITH, BURMA:
INSURGENCY AND THE POLITICS OF ETHNICITY 27 (1991)).
55. Mark E. Denham & Mark Owen Lombardi, Perspectives on Third- World Sovereignty: Problems
ivith(ou) Borders, in PERSPECTIVES ON THIRD-WORLD SOVEREIGNTY 1,7 (Mark E. Denham& Mark Owen
Lombardi eds., 1996) ("[T]he national identity of Southern peoples was not appreciably affected by the
enclosure and consolidation represented by Westphalia and traditional ethnic identifications remained to
inhibit the impact and potency of state sovereignty.").
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other disadvantages. But the handicap of working within the form of the State
without the substantive coherence that preceded the formation of juridical
States in Europe is consistently described in the literature as acutely
debilitating. Robert Jackson describes such developing countries as "quasi-
states." 6
Acute heterogeneity and lack of community coherence take many specific
forms in the developing world. Regulatory bureaucracies are beset by a host
of pathologies, many of which "can be traced directly or indirectly to the
recruitment and allocation of public servants along personality, family, ethnic,
religious, regional and factional lines."5" Tri Nguyen does not mince words
in describing the nature of these pathologies as "self-serving, authoritarian,
over-staffed, corrupt, inert, ineffectual, top heavy and bottom thin, lacking
qualified managers and professionals, irrational salary schemes and incentive
systems, excessively centralized, hamstrung by inefficient rules and
procedures, accustomed to selective rule enforcement, process rather than
results oriented, and so forth.""s
National bureaucracies are, of course, the primary conduits for
implementation of international law obligations. Moreover, entire sectors of
developing economies operate outside the realm of law. The scope and
regularity of these extra-legal transactions have been described as giving rise
to a "shadow state."59 These shortcomings call into question the capacity of
States to represent themselves as fully functional participants in international
regimes entailing burdensome regulatory obligations.
A second consequence of weak empirical Statehood is the widespread
absence of participatory politics at the national level. With cultural ties
maintained at the local (and not national) level, leaders often impose political
coherence by force. More will be said later about efforts to overcome this
divisiveness. The point here concerns the results. When the State is not seen
as the primary locus of identity for citizens, there is much suspicion to be
overcome when the State seeks to convince citizens that it is acting in their
interests.' When loyalty, in the form of obedience to national policy, is not
56. See ROBERT H. JACKSON, QUASI-STATES: SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND THE
THIRD WORLD (1990).
57. NGUYEN, supra note 21, at 37.
58. Id.
59. Joseph, Reconfiguration, supra note 52, at 72.
60. BEETHAM, supra note 28, at 133 ("[Where ... a sense of nationhood is only weakly developed,
and there is no single ethnic or cultural community within the territory with which people identify, its
absence will be revealed in the degree of loyalty the state can command when under pressure.").
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forthcoming, the State often resorts to coercive force in order to achieve
desired ends. This frequently has the effect of diminishing loyalty to national
institutions even further. Faced with this double distancing of the State from
its citizens, the State finds itself with few palatable options: it can continue
governing by force or through favoritism to certain groups, which will have
the effect of further delegitimizing national institutions; or it can attempt to
liberalize, in which case a competitive political environment is likely to break
down along existing lines of loyalty, ethnicity, religion, and the like. David
Beetham has noted this unfortunate double bind: "the ability of liberal
democracies to satisfy the legitimating criteria of an accepted source of
authority and expressed popular consent, is incompatible with the attainment
of a recognisable general interest in the circumstances of most developing
countries."'"
What we are left with, then, is an extraordinary asymmetry in the
capacities of developed and developing States to function as empirical States.
While there are certainly a range of factors contributing to this imbalance-lack
of resources, lingering effects of colonialism, Cold War interventions, the
economic advantages of economies of scale, etc.-only the disjunction between
borders and political communities is squarely a matter of international law.
This unfortunate reality, as we have seen, is grounded in a universalizing of
the juridical State beyond its European origins in cohesive political
communities.
II
The second proposition is that the international community might have
responded in a number of ways to this asymmetry. One way States have
responded is to eradicate virtually all instances of dejure inequality between
States under international law.62 While a small step in the face of vast
inequalities of power, the now foundational doctrine of juridical equality
"makes enough difference in the processes of international law and politics to
modestly vindicate the significance and effectiveness of the system of
sovereign equality."63 But only modestly. States might have taken more
61. Id. at 171-72.
62. Article 2(l) of the U.N. Charter states that the Organization is "based on the principle of the
sovereign equality of all its Members." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. I. See P.H. KOOIJMANS, THE
DOCTRINE OF LEGAL EQUALITY OF STATES: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1964).
63. Benedict Kingsbury, Sovereignty and Inequality, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 599, 600 (1998).
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decisive steps and addressed the problem directly in international law. The
process of State consolidation in Europe involved both violent changes in
control over territory and the forcible integration of once disparate peoples
into unified communities under a single sovereign. States in the developing
world might have been allowed to replicate this dynamic under international
law.
First, the lack of "fit" between sub-State communities and national
borders in the developing world might have been addressed by permitting
those communities to form their own States. That is, international law might
have developed a right of secession for groups self-identified as coherent
political communities.' Allowing secession might not necessarily lead to the
dissolution of all existing States or to a proliferation of microstates: some
communities might choose to band together; others might join existing States
with which they feel a greater kinship; and some existing States, faced with
potential dissolution, might devise power-sharing arrangements to entice
secessionist groups to remain within their borders. Whatever path this
rearrangement of borders might take, it would allow the developing world to
approximate the European process of territorial consolidation in some small
way.
Despite claims of historic injustice and ongoing oppression, a majority of
States has clearly and repeatedly refused to sanction a right of secession in
international law. 65 Because virtually every State has potential secessionist
groups within its borders, it should not be surprising that virtually no State has
advocated a rule permitting secession. But States have also recognized that
right of secession would almost inevitably give rise to a new "Scramble for
Africa" (or Asia or Europe): existing States would vie for broken pieces of
neighboring States, governments would resist attempted secessions by
resource-rich areas of their own territories, and ethnically homogenous States
would urge their kinsmen in other States to break lose and join a "Greater"
State X. The benefits of a free market in Statehood, in other words, would be
dwarfed by the carnage of its transaction costs. International law has
repeatedly reflected this conclusion by favoring the principle of territorial
64. Makau wa Mutua makes a different proposal, suggesting that the map of Africa be redrawn
through a collective effort of peoples, governments, and regional organizations. Mutua, supra note 48, at
1160-67. While intriguing, at present this proposal has little prospect of realization.
65. See, e.g., Hurst Hannum, The Right ofSelf-Determination in the Twenty-First Century, 55 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 773, 776 (1998); see generally Gregory H. Fox, Self-Determination in the Post-Cold War
Era: A New Internal Focus?, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 733, 737-47 (1995) [hereinafter Fox, Self-
Determination].
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integrity over the right to self-determination.' Boundaries cannot be changed
by forcible annexation,67 State succession, 8 or a change in the circumstances
attending the negotiation of border treaties.69 Most notable has been the
international community's insistence on maintaining existing boundaries of
States where ethnic animosities appear to make meaningful political
cooperation at the national level impossible.7" The Canadian Supreme Court,
66. See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N.
GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, 124, U.N. Doc. A./8028 (1970) [hereinafter Friendly Relations
Declaration] (qualifying the right to self-determination with the provision that "[niothing in the foregoing
paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair,
totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity . . ." of States); Vienna Declaration and
Programme ofAction, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/23 (1993); MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 181-82
(4th ed. 1997) ("[slelf-determination has also been used in conjunction with the principle of territorial
integrity... to prevent a rule permitting secession from independent states from arising"); FRANCK, supra
note 7, at 154-72 (detailing inconsistent application of self-determination principle since World War I in
a way that precludes emergence of any coherent rule).
67. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits Member States from using force "against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state . I..." n its 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration, the
General Assembly stated that "the territory of a state shall not be the object of acquisition by another state
resulting from the threat or use of force. No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force
shall be recognized as legal." Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 66. In 1990, the Security
Council declared that Iraq's attempted annexation of Kuwait "under any form and whatever pretext has no
legal validity, and is considered null and void." S.C. Res. 662, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2934th mtg. at 20,
U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990).
68. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, 17 I.L.M. 1488 (1978) ("A
succession of States does not as such affect: (a) a boundary established by treaty; or (b) obligations and
rights established by a treaty and relating to the regime of a boundary."); Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 1, 4 ("A boundary established by treaty thus achieves a permanence which
the treaty itself does not necessarily enjoy. The treaty can cease to be in force without in any way effecting
the continuance of the boundary.").
69. Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties ("A fundamental change of circumstances may not be
involved as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty: (a) if the treaty establishes a boundary
.... .).
70. 1 refer to Bosnia and Kosovo. In Bosnia, the Dayton Accords and relevant Security Council
resolutions repeatedly reaffirmed support for the territorial integrity of the Bosnian state. See General
Framework Agreement For Peace, U.N. Doc. S/1995/999 (1995) (parties renounce resort to any action
"against the territorial integrity or political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina .. "); U.N. Doc.
S/Res/1 022 (1995) (affirming as a basis for peace settlement "preserving the territorial integrity ofall States
[of the former Yugoslavia] within their internationally recognized borders . . ."). Similarly, the
Ahtishaari/Chernomyrdin/Milosovic agreement for Kosovo, as well as the supporting Security Council
resolution, renounce any intention to interfere with the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia. See Letter Dated 7 June 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Germany to the
United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1999/649/Annex (1999)
(interim political framework for Kosovo's self-government to be based, inter alia, on the "sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.. ."); U.N. Doc. S/Res/1244 (1999) (citing
previous Council resolutions and reaffirming "the commitment of all [UN] Member States to the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia...").
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in holding that international law did not afford Quebec a right to secede,
summarized relevant practice on this question:
The international law principle of self-determination has
evolved within a framework of respect for the territorial
integrity of existing states. The various international
documents that support the existence of a people's right to
self-determination also contain parallel statements supportive
of the conclusion that the exercise of such a right must be
sufficiently limited to prevent threats to an existing state's
territorial integrity or the stability of relations between
sovereign states.7'
Second, international law might have developed a rule allowing
consolidation to occur within existing borders by any means necessary. This
option has also been rather decisively rejected by a majority of States. The
international law of human rights will not sanction the forcible subjugation of
distinctive communities within States. As Charles Tilly notes, such tactics
were common fare during the formative era of European State-building:
The building of states in Western Europe cost tremendously
in death, suffering, loss of rights, and unwilling surrender of
land, goods, or labor... The fundamental reason for the high
cost of European state building was its beginning in the midst
of a decentralized, largely peasant social structure. Building
differentiated, autonomous, centralized organizations with
effective control of territories entailed eliminating thousands
of semi-autonomous authorities ... Most of the European
population resisted each phase of the creation of strong
states.,2
71. In the Matter of Section 53 of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26; In the Matter of a
Reference by the Governor in Council concerning certain questions relating to the secession of Quebec from
Canada, as set out in Order in Council P.C., 1996-1497 [1996] 2 Can. S.C.R. 217 (1998).
72. Charles Tilly, Reflections on the History of European State Making, in THE FORMATION OF
NATIONAL STATES IN WESTERN EUROPE 71 (1975), quoted in Mohammed Ayoob, State Making, State
Breaking and State Failure, in MANAGING GLOBAL CHAOS: SOURCES OF AND RESPONSES TO
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 37, 40 (Chester A. Crocker et al. eds., 1996)).
STRENGTHENING THE STATE
This process took many centuries and, at points, degenerated into chaos
and bloodshed. Mohammed Ayoob comments that "there was no dearth of
'Somalias' and 'Liberias' in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe. 73
While Western States only "emerged as the responsive and representative
modem states that we know them to be today"'74 at the beginning of the
twentieth century, forcible rearrangements of population continued. In 1923,
Greece and Turkey even entered into a Convention Concerning the Exchange
of Greek and Turkish Populations, pursuant to which "Turkish nationals of the
Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory" were exchanged for
"Greek nationals of the Moslem religion established in Greek territory."'75
Germans were evicted from Eastern Europe following the Second World
War.76 And the fall of communism has given this old technique of national
consolidation the new name of ethnic cleansing. 7
International human rights law now prohibits forced homogenization of
virtually any kind. Not only are States prevented from compelling adherence
to dominant ideologies,78 religions,79 or political groupings," but they are also
affirmatively obligated to accommodate the practices of minority groups
within their borders." Indeed, States are further obligated to prohibit by law
any advocacy that denigrates particular races, religions, or ethnicities.82 In
73. Ayoob, supra note 72, at 41.
74. Id.
75. Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, Jan. 30, 1923, Greece-
Turk., art. 1, 32 L.N.T.S. 75.
76. See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS, MASS EXPULSION IN MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
PRACTICE 8 (1995).
77. See Alfred de Zayas, The Right to One's Homeland, Ethnic Cleansing, and the International
Criminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 6 CRIM. L. F. 257, 260 (1995).
78. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 41, art. 18(2) (freedom of
conscience and thought); Universal Declaration on Human Rights, supra note 41, art. 18 (same).
79. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 41, art. 18 (freedom of religion);
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, supra note 41, art. 18 (same).
80. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 41, art. 22 (freedom of
association); Universal Declaration on Human Rights, supra note 41, art. 20 (same).
81. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 41, art. 27 (ethnic, religious or
linguistic minorities "shall not be denied the right, in their community with the other members of their
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language");
Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, Opinion 2,31 I.L.M. 1488 (1992) (describing respect
for the rights of minorities as a "peremptory" norm of international law).
82. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 41, art. 20 ("any advocacy of
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall
be prohibited by law"); International Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Racial Discrimination,
March 7, 1966, art. 4(a), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (State Parties "shall declare an offence punishable by law all
dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, [and] incitement to racial discrimination....")
and art. 4(b) (State Parties "shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all other
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international law, the right of individual autonomy in such matters clearly
trumps claims of national entitlement to consolidation.
Kosovo exemplifies the lengths to which the international community will
go in order to prevent forced internal consolidation. As the conflict between
Serbs and Kosovar Albanians escalated, international actors were faced with
powerful forces in Kosovo advocating opposing political outcomes:
wholesale consolidation into Yugoslavia or full Kosovar independence. The
forces of consolidation had some history in their favor. The various attempts
at ethnic purification by Serbia included an abortive agreement with Turkey
in 1938 to deport up to 400,000 Kosovar Albanians. 3 Repression of the
Albanian majority began again in the late 1980s, culminating in massacres and
forced deportations in 1998.84 However, the forces of independence could
point to a forty-year history of Kosovar autonomy under Tito and an ethnic,
religious, linguistic, and cultural distinctiveness dating to the time of the
Ottoman occupation.
The Security Council opted for neither of the outcomes desired by the
parties to the conflict. The Council instead endorsed an extreme form of the
functional autonomy Kosovo had enjoyed prior to 1989.5 The Tito-era
borders were effectively frozen as the Council affirmed "the commitment of
all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States in the region." 6 At the same
time, all Yugoslav federal authority over Kosovo was effectively terminated.
The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the NATO-led intervention
force, was vested with "[a]ll legislative and executive powers, including the
administration of the judiciary." 7 Ultimate decision-making authority over
the legal regime applicable to any given question was granted to a Special
propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination .. "). See generally Elizabeth F.
Defeis, Freedom of Speech and International Norms: A Response to Hate Speech, 29 STAN J. INT'L L. 57
(1992).
83. NOEL MALCOLM, KOSOVO: A SHORT HISTORY 285-86 (Harper Perennial 1999) (1998).
84. No Place for Them Both, ECONOMIST, Apr. 3-Apr. 6, 1999, at 20,21; Is Kosovo Real? The Battle
Over History Continues, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 1999, at 130, 135 (1999).
85. Beginning in early 1998, the Security Council began calling for "an enhanced status for Kosovo
which would include a substantially greater degree of autonomy and meaningful self-administration."
S.C.Res. 1160, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3868th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/I 160 (1998). See also S.C.
Res. 1199, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3930th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 199 (1998); S.C. Res. 1203, U.N.
SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3937th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (1998); S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 4th Sess.,
401 Ith mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999).
86. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 85, at 2.
87. United Nations Interim Adminstration Mission in Kosovo: Report of the Secretary General, 54th
Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1999/779 35 (1999).
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Representative of the Secretary-General." The International Security Force
(KFOR) exercised control over Kosovo's borders, both with Serbia and with
neighboring States. 9
While the precise status of Kosovo remains highly ambiguous, the
ambiguity is entirely a result of the conflicting imperatives guiding Security
Council action. Allowing Belgrade to retain full authority over Kosovo would
have been inconsistent with a commitment to human rights. But permitting
Kosovar independence would have undermined the broad international
consensus opposing a right to secession." As a result, Kosovo remained
Yugoslav dejure but became independent defacto. This artificially-sustained
life in limbo is in marked contrast to the course events would likely have taken
in an era before options for heterogeneous States were radically circumscribed
through international law. If Kosovo had attempted to secede, it would likely
have been reabsorbed into Yugoslavia. This would have been followed by an
aggressive campaign of homogenization. As Ayoob notes, "the elimination
of states considered inviable, either because of their internal contradictions or
because their existence did not suit great power aspirations, was perfectly
acceptable to the European international community virtually through the end
of the First World War." 9'
The international community has, thus, left itself few options in
addressing the predicament of weak empirical States. Existing borders, which
enclose juridical but not empirical States, have been sanctified and cannot be
altered through the assertion of a legal entitlement to secede. At the same
time, governments in these States cannot forcibly compel adherence to a
national political culture.
88. Id, 39.
89. Military-Technical Agreement Between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the
Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/1999/682 (Enclosure) art. 11(h) (1999).
90. This sentiment was particularly strong in regard to the Balkans. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State
Strobe Talbot stated in an August 1999 speech:
In Kosovo... [wie have suspended Belgrade's powers as the administering authority
over the province. But that does not mean we support Kosovo's independence. Quite
the contrary, we feel that secession would give heart to separatists and irredentists
of every stripe elsewhere in the region. Most of all, secession would encourage
proponents of Greater Albania-a single state stretching across the Balkan peninsula
from Albania proper to northwestern Macedonia, with its own sizable ethnic
Albanian population. Greater Albania would be no less anathema to regional peace
and stability than Greater Serbia.
U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, Address at the Aspen Institute (Aug. 24, 1999) (transcript
available at <http:lwww.state.gov/www/policy remarksl19991990824_talbott-aspen.html>).
91. Ayoob, supra note 72, at 42.
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In light of this dilemma, it is worth reiterating why weak empirical States
in the developing world have become the subject of international norms. First,
weak empirical Statehood undermines the traditional assumption ofjuridical
Statehood that States have at least a minimal institutional capacity to carry out
their international obligations. Second, the crises resulting from ineffective
domestic institutions have crowded the agendas of international organizations,
compelling an exponential and sometimes dubious expansion of their
jurisdiction.9 2 Third, the principle ofjuridical equality becomes increasingly
detached from reality with the widening of inequalities in empirical Statehood.
III
The third proposition is that international actors are using international
law to strengthen the empirical State through norms intended to invigorate and
legitimize national political institutions. The empirical State, in other words,
has been largely subsumed into the juridical State. But it is a conception of
the juridical State vastly expanded from the minimalist model that attended
the emergence of early modern European States. It is a notion of Statehood
that encompasses all manner of domestic processes contributing to the
efficient and equitable conduct of politics. International law now contains
rules relating to the whole of the State and, at least in the developing world,
is being used to strengthen the capacity of developing States to participate
more fully in international life.
This is not to say that international law now reflects a precise blueprint for
governmental reform in weak empirical States. As international organizations
have become increasingly concerned with domestic politics, many States have
been careful to counter-balance calls for more inclusive domestic politics with
warnings that no single model of government is appropriate to all (or even
most) States.93 In human rights law, this solicitude is implicit in the "margin
92. See FRANK, supra note 9, at 218-83 (discussing the expansion of Security Council jurisdiction
over "threats to the peace" to include purely internal crises, such as in Libya and Somalia).
93. See Respect for the Principles of National Sovereignty and Non-Interference in the Internal
Affairs of States in their Electoral Processes, G.A. Res. 119, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., No. 2 (1997) ("it is
the concern solely of peoples to determine methods and to establish institutions regarding the electoral
process, as well as to determine the ways for its implementation according to their constitution and national
legislation"). See also, BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI, AN AGENDA FOR DEMOCRATIZATION I (1996) ("there
is no one model of democratization or democracy suitable to all societies").
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of appreciation" afforded States in, for example, designing electoral systems.94
But recognizing the diversity of national political processes does not mean
certain specific goals deemed essential to strengthening the empirical State are
lacking.
The overarching framework of these efforts has been the encouragement
of transitions to political democracy. In more or less explicit terms, the UN
Secretary-General,95 the Security Council,' the General Assembly,97 the
Human Rights Commission,98 various regional bodies," and international
lenders"° have all identified democratic institutions as the vehicle by which
governance can become coherent, peaceful, and legitimate. While these actors
do not always define "democracy" with precision, they frequently speak of the
familiar pairing of majoritarian elections with the protection of counter-
majoritarian rights. Elections are seen as seminal transition points, and much
international effort has gone into monitoring elections and, where the results
are not respected, exerting pressure to allow the victors to take office.
94. See, e.g., Liberal Party v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8765/79,21 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
211 (1980); Lindsay v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8364/78, 15 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 247
(1979).
95. See The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development
in Africa: Report of the Secretary-General to the United Nations Security Council, U.N. GAOR, 52 Sess.,
Agenda Item 10, para. 78, U.N. Doc. A/52/871-S/1998/318 (1998) [hereinafter The Causes of Conflict]
("[I]n the absence of genuinely democratic institutions, contending interests are likely to seek to settle their
differences through conflict rather than accommodation . . .[;] democratization gives people a stake in
society. Its importance cannot be overstated, for unless people feel that they have a true stake in society
lasting peace will not be possible.").
96. See Fox, Self-Determination, supra note 65, at 753 n.98 (citing numerous Security Council
resolutions affirming the importance of democratic transitions to the permanent resolution of internal
conflicts).
97. See Strengthening the Role of the United Nations in Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle
of Periodic and Genuine Elections and the Promotion of Democratization, G.A. Res. 50/185 (1995) (The
"assistance provided upon the request of Governments for the conduct of free and fair elections, including
assistance in the human rights aspects of elections and public information about elections, is of particular
importance in the strengthening and building of institutions relating to human rights and the strengthening
of a pluralistic civil society.").
98. Promotion of the Right to Democracy, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm. Res. 55th Sess., 57th Mtg.
at 1, available at <http://www.unhcr.ch/huridocda/hur...E.CNA.RES. 1999.57> (stating that "democracy
fosters the full realization of all human rights" and urging the international community to help States "build
a democratic political culture through the observance of human rights, mobilization of civil society and
other appropriate measures in support of democratic governance").
99. See, e.g., Case of Socialist Party and Others v. Turkey, Case No. 20/1997/804/1007,147 (1998)
("It is of the essence of democracy to allow diverse political programmes to be proposed and debated, even
those that call into question the way a State is currently organized, provided that they do not harm
democracy itself.").
100. Leila L. Frischtak, Governance Capacity and Economic Reform in DevelopingCountries, World
Bank Technical Paper No. 254 (1994).
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The United Nations and many regional organizations now maintain
permanent election-monitoring divisions that are at the disposal of Member
States.'' There are also a large number of non-governmental bodies that work
in tandem with the international organizations monitoring elections.'0 2 The
pervasiveness of election-monitoring is now such that it is quite difficult for
a government to "rig" or overturn an election without the knowledge of
outsiders.
During the Cold War, such initiatives would have foundered on
ideological divisions as to what constitutes a "free and fair" election, whether
monitoring elections infringes on States' protected domestic jurisdiction, and
on the consequences for inter-State relations of declaring a particular
candidate or party the victor in a national election. While these three
questions continue to provoke vigorous debate, there is now a substantial
practice supporting tentative answers.0 3 On the question of defining a "free
and fair" election, the fundamental criteria are to be found in such human
rights instruments as Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights." 4 Treaty bodies have developed a substantial jurisprudence
elucidating the requirements of these instruments, resolving such difficult
interpretive questions as whether one-party elections are consistent with
requirements of choice and freedom of association (they are not).' The UN
101. See generally YVES BREGBEDER, INTERNATIONAL MONITORING OF PLEBISCITES, REFERENDA AND
NATIONAL ELECTIONS (1994).
102. See United Nations ElectoralAssistance: A System- Wide Endeavor, available at <www.un.org/
Depts/dpa/docs/website7.htm> (visited Oct. 24, 1999) (listing non-governmental organizations cooperating
with UN in electoral assistance missions).
103. The following section is taken largely from Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation
in International Laiv, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAw (Gregory H. Fox & Brad
R. Roth eds., forthcoming 2000).
104. Article 25(b) provides that every citizen shall have the right "to vote and to be elected at genuine
periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot,
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors." See also, American Convention on Human
Rights, art. 23(1)(b); Protocol (No. I) to the European Convention on Human Rights, art. 3 (1952); African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 13(I).
105. See Bwyalya v. Zambia, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/48/40 (Part II), Report of the
Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 31411988, at para. 6.6 (1993) (finding that a one party
State constitutes "an unreasonable restriction of the right to participate in the conduct of public afthirs");
Socialist Party v. Turkey, supra note 99, para. 41 (rejecting ban on Turkish Socialist Party and holding that
"there can be no democracy without pluralism"); Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, OAE/Ser.L/V/II.88 Doc. 9 rev, at 49 (1995) ("[m]odem democracy may be said to be
founded on political parties").
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and other election monitors have developed criteria of fairness that have been
used so many times that they now approach the status of boilerplate."°
As to the second issue, until quite recently international lawyers assumed
that holding national elections, or indeed any questions related to the selection
of national leaders, were matters reserved to States' domestic jurisdiction.'""
This was true, it was believed, because international law simply did not reflect
any particular theory of governmental legitimacy. This claim is still made
today, most prominently in a series of General Assembly resolutions." 8
However, as a description of State practice, such agnosticism regarding the
merits of democratic government is simply inaccurate. Global and regional
organizations have, on several occasions, issued resolutions condemning the
overthrow of elected governments and calling for the restoration of
"legitimate" rulers." 9  Of particular note are resolutions of the African
Commission on Human Rights, in which it has declared "the fundamental
principle that all governments should be based on the consent of the people
freely expressed by them and through their chosen representatives.""'
Addressing military regimes, the African Commission called upon "incumbent
military governments to hand over political power to democratically elected
governments without prolonging their incumbencies and unnecessarily
delaying the return to democratic civilian rule.""' When the elected
government of Sierra Leone was ousted by a military junta on May 25, 1997,
the Organization of African Unity foreign ministers "strongly and
106. See HUMAN RIGHTS AND ELECTIONS: A HANDBOOK ON THE LEGAL, TECHNICAL AND HUMAN
RIGHTS ASPECTS OF ELECTIONS (1994).
107. See RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OFTHE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWOFTHE UNITEDSTATES §203, cmt. e
(American Law Institute ed., 3d ed. 1987) ("International law does not generally address domestic
constitutional issues, such as how a national government is formed.").
108. See Respect for the Principles of National Sovereignty, supra note 93, at para. I ("by virtue of
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United
Nations, all peoples have the right, freely and without external interference, to determine their political
status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development"). Virtually identical resolutions were
adopted in prior years.
109. See, e.g., Support to the Democratic Government of Haiti, MRE/RES.1/91 Corr. 1, OEA/Ser.
F/V. I (199 1) (OAS foreign ministers condemn ouster of elected President Aristide of Haiti and declare his
government "the only legitimate representatives of the Government of Haiti"); The Situation of Democracy
and Human Rights in Haiti, G.A. Res. 46/7, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess. (1991) (condemning the "attempted
illegal replacement of the constitutional President of Haiti"); S.C. Res. 1162, U.N. SCOR, 3872d mtg.
(1998) (Security Council commends regional peacekeeping force for restoring deposed president of Sierra
Leone).
110. Resolution on the Gambia, Eighth Annual Activity Report of the Commission on Human and
Peoples Rights, 1994-45, Thirty-First Ordinary Session, 26-28 June 1995, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 42 (1995)
[hereinafter African Commission Report].
Ill. Resolution on the Military, in African Commission Report, supra note 110, at 39.
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unequivocally" condemned the coup and called on "all African countries, and
the International Community at large, to refrain from recognizing the new
regime and lending support in any form whatsoever to the perpetrators of the
coup d'etat."' "2
Summarizing recent experience, the UN Secretary-General has described
as an "established norm" the view that "military coups against democratically
elected Governments by self-appointed juntas are not acceptable.""' 3 While
these actions focus predominantly on usurpations of elected regimes, rather
than States in which "free and fair" elections have not been held at all, the
question of governmental legitimacy is clearly no longer part of the protected
domestic sphere.
The third question, concerning the consequences of a democratic
legitimacy principle, presents the area of greatest normative innovation. The
idea of governmental legitimacy involves substantive criteria that determine
a regime's entitlement to represent the State it purports to govern.
Governments stand in an agency relationship with States. A principle of
democratic legitimacy would legally disqualify agents not chosen according
to "democratic" procedures. While, in theory, the legitimacy principle set out
in instruments such as Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights would mandate de-recognition of all regimes not chosen
democratically, few international actors have advocated such an extreme
position. The European Union has come closest to this view by limiting its
new membership to democratic States that respect basic human rights." 4
What is more common is an adherence to legitimacy criteria where elected
governments have been ousted by extra-constitutional means. The
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Organization of
American States, and MERCOSUR have all adopted policies of refusing to
recognize coup-installed regimes in their Member States." 5 Organs of the
112. Decision Adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at its Sixty-
Sixth Ordinary Session, U.N. GAOR, 52 Sess., Annex I, Agenda Item 42, at 24, 25, U.N. Doc.
A/52/465 (1997).
113. Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work ofthe Organization, U.N. GAOR, 52 Sess.,
Supp. No. 1, para. 37, U.N. Doc. A/52/1 (1997).
114. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, art. F, para. 1-3, 31 I.L.M. 247, 256.
115. In its Moscow Document, the participating states of the OSCE (then the CSCE) pledge to "support
vigorously" the "legitimate organs" of a state in case of"overthrow or attempted overthrow of a legitimately
elected government." Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Document of the Moscow
Meeting on the Human Dimension, Emphasizing Respect for Human Rights, Pluralistic Democracy, the
Rule of Lmv, and Procedures for Fact-Finding, Oct. 3, 1991,30 I.L.M. 1670, 1677 (1991). The OAS, in
its 1992 Washington Protocol, provided for the suspension from its General Assembly of any member state
"whose democratically constituted government has been overthrown by force." 1992 WASH PROTOCOL,
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United Nations have refused to accredit delegates from such regimes as
Cambodia, Haiti, and Sierra Leone." 6 In the cases of Haiti and Sierra Leone,
the UN Security Council also took the remarkable step of authorizing military
intervention in order to restore the elected leaders to power." 7 In the cases of
Nigeria and Myanmar, where winners of elections were prevented from
assuming office, UN organs have only condemned the actions and called upon
the incumbent governments to respect electoral results."' The European
Union (EU) has taken a slightly different approach, inserting provisions in all
its treaties with non-EU States providing that the observance of democratic
principles is an essential element of the instrument." 9 Failure to adhere to
such principles will constitute a material breach of the treaty, permitting the
EU to suspend compliance with its treaty obligations.
The problem of acute heterogeneity is only partially addressed, however,
by a system of majoritarian democracy. Even in a system of proportional
representation, a minority group may find itself either unable to muster a
plurality of popular votes, or to join ruling coalitions with other minorities.
OEA/ser. P./OAS Doc. AG./doc. II (XVI-E/92). MECORSUR's 1996 Protocol of Ushuaia provides that
any disruption of democracy in a Member State may lead to a suspension of that State's right to participate
in MERCOSUR organs. Protocol de Ushuaia Sobre Compromiso Democrfttico en el Mercosur, la
Reptiblica de Bolivia y la Republica de Chile, arts. 4 & 5 (1996), (visited Oct. 27, 1999)
<http://www.idrc.ca/1acro/investigacion/mercosur2.html>.
116. See U.N. Doe. A/52/719, 5 (1997) (UN General Assembly's Credentials Committee refuses to
accept credentials of rival Cambodian factions, thus denying representation to Hun Sen regime in effective
control of the country); The Situation of Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti, supra note 109 (affirming
as "unacceptable any entity resulting" from coup against Aristide government in Haiti); BRAD R. ROTH,
GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 406 (1999) (deposed government of Sierra Leone
retained its seat in the General Assembly).
117. U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg. at I, U.N. Doc. S/Res/940 (1994) (authorizing multinational
forces to use "all necessary means" to facilitate "the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and
the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti..."); U.N. SCOR, 52nd Sess., 3822d
mtg. at 203, U.N. Doe S/Res/I 132 (1997) (addressing coup in Sierra Leone and demanding "the restoration
of the democratically-elected Government and a return to constitutional order..."); U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess.,
3872d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doe. S/Res/I 162 (1998) (commending Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) for its role in forcibly ousting coup-installed government in Sierra Leone). See Karsten Nowrot
& Emily W. Schabacker, The Use of Force to Restore Democracy: International Legal Implications of
the ECOWAS Intervention in Sierra Leone, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 321 (1998); W. Michael Reisman,
Haiti and the Validity of International Action, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 82 (1995).
118. See G.A. Res. 197, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49 at 217, U.N. Doc. A/49/197 (1994)
(urging government of Myanmar to "take all necessary steps towards democracy in the light of the results
of the elections held in 1990..."); G.A. Res. 51/109, U.N. GAOR, 51 st Sess., Supp. No. 49 at 257-8, U.N.
Doc. A/51/109 (1996) (urging Nigerian military regime to "take furtherconcrete steps to restore democratic
government...").
119. On the Inclusion of Respect for Democratic Principles and Human Rights in Agreements between
the Community and Third Countries, COM(95) 216; see Barbara Brandtner & Allan Sosas, Human Rights
and the External Relations of the European Community: An Analysis of Doctrine and Practice, 9 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 468. 473-77 (1998).
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International law responded to this problem beginning with the majority
protection regimes of the inter-war period. In the post-Cold War era, as David
Wippman has demonstrated, international law has reflected a careful balance
between the assimilationist tendencies of many majority cultures and the
preservation of minority groups' communal integrity. 20 Recent minority-
rights instruments have done so by "explicitly ban[ning] policies or practices
aimed at involuntary assimilation," as well as by prescribing "affirmative
measures designed to enable minorities to resist more subtle assimilationist
pressures."'' Cultural, ethnic, and religious identities are thereby
protected.'22 While these instruments appear to embrace pluralism as a
permanent and indeed positive phenomenon, they nonetheless provide that
minorities must also have opportunities to participate effectively in national
political processes.'
Finally, enhancing the rule of law in developing countries is a third means
of fostering legitimate governance.'24 "Rule of law" is something of an
umbrella term, encompassing norms such as: a right to a remedy for
violations of human rights,' limitations on amnesties for violators of
fundamental human rights,'26 fairness considerations in the administration of
120. David Wippman, The Evolution and Implementation of Minority Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
597, 604-08 (1997).
121. Id. at 606.
122. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 41, art. 27; Council of
Europe: Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Feb. 1, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 351
(1995); Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic
Minorities, G.A. Res. 135, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Annex at 210-211, U.N. Doc. A/47/135 (1993).
123. Wippman, supra note 120, at 608 n.55 (citing a variety of instruments providing for right of
effective participation in public affairs).
124. See Assistance to States in strengthening the rule of law, E.S.C. Res. 48, U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts.
Comm., 48th Sess., 58th mtg. at 158, U.N. Doc. E/SR.58 (1997) ("[T]he rule of law is an essential factor
in the protection of human rights and should continue to attract the attention of the international
community .. "); Strengthening the Rule of Law: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 52d
Sess., Supp. No. 49 at 63, U.N. Doc A152/475 (1997) (detailing numerous efforts by organs of the UN
system to strengthen the rule of law). In this Symposium, see Maxwell 0. Chibundu, Globalizing the Rule
of Law: Some Thoughts at and on the Periphery, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 79 (1999).
125. See sources supra note 41. See also, Caso Castillo Paez, Inter-Am. C.H.R. I/A, 34,
OEA/ser.I./R./34.90 (1997) (State under a duty to investigate human rights abuses); Aksoy v. Turkey, 26
Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2287 (1996) ("[T]he notion of an 'effective remedy' entails, in addition to the payment of
compensation where appropriate, a thorough and effective investigation capable of leading to the
identification and punishment of those responsible and including effective access for the complainant to
the investigatory procedure.").
126. The UN Human Rights Committee has observed that:
some States have granted amnesty in respect of acts of torture. Amnesties are
generally incompatible with the duty of the States to investigate such acts; to
guarantee freedom from such acts within their jurisdiction; and to ensure that they
do not occur in the future. States may not deprive individuals of the right to an
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justice (due process),'27 and guarantees of judicial independence.' 28 These
initiatives are designed to enhance the predictability and neutrality of national
legal systems. In a sense, they are the corporeal embodiment of a
strengthened empirical State, designed to translate its values of inclusion and
tolerance into concrete outcomes.
Each of these international legal initiatives seeks to assist in legitimating
national political institutions and processes. Of course, political legitimacy
can be measured in a variety of ways. A government brought to power by
citizen consent (legal legitimacy) may nonetheless fail to meet popular
expectations (empirical legitimacy), or it may govern unjustly (moral
legitimacy).'29 International law, quite obviously, reflects primarily legal
conceptions of legitimacy. For example, human rights instruments requiring
free and fair elections prescribe an institutional framework that is presumed
by a theory of popular sovereignty to legitimate the exercise of power. 3'
Realistically, international law can achieve little more. Global and regional
organizations are simply not in a position to assure effective governance in
their Member States, let alone to ensure that rulers exercise power in
accordance with a particular moral scheme.
effective remedy, including compensation and such full rehabilitation as may be
possible.
U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 44th Sess., 1138th mtg. at 193, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 109/SR.1138 (General
Comment No. 20) (1992). See also, Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-
legal Arbitrary and Summary Executions, E.S.C. Res. 65, U.N. ESCOR, 15th mtg., at 53, U.N. Doc.
E/SR. 1989/65 (1989) ("In no circumstances, including a state of war, siege or other public emergency, shall
blanket immunity from prosecution be granted to any person allegedly involved in extra-legal, arbitrary or
summary executions."); Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Hum.
Rts. Comm. Res. 1999/32, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 55th mtg. at para. 2 (1999), available at
<http://www.unchr.ch/Huridoca/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/2e6428d56b 127ea78025676300586> (visited
Nov. 29, 1999) (urging "all Governments to ... abrogate legislation leading to impunity for those
responsible for grave violations of human rights such as torture and prosecute such violations").
127. See DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: ITS ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 395-458 (1994) (detailing Human
Rights Committee jurisprudence concerning rights of criminal defendants).
128. See Report of the Special Rapporteur, Independence and Impartiality of the Judiciary, Jurors and
Assessors and the Independence of Lawyers, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/39, paras. 32-52 (1995) (stating that
"the requirements of independent and impartial justice are universal" and detailing their grounding in
international instruments and practice).
129. See BEETHAM, supra note 28, at 4-7.
130. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 41, art. 21, para. 3 (providing that
"the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government." The Declaration goes on to
require that the "will" be expressed "in periodic and genuine elections"). The Human Rights Committee
has stated that Article 25 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, guaranteeing genuine periodic
elections, "lies at the core of democratic government based on the consent of the people." General
Comment 25, para. I (Dec. 7, 1996).
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The notion of legal legitimacy, however, carries with it what might be
called a "weak" theory of empirical legitimacy. This weak theory is a central
element in efforts to strengthen developing States, for those efforts respond
to the reality of governmental dysfunction. Unless the legitimation initiatives
described above make tangible differences in the quality of governance, they
will fail to address the weaknesses of the empirical State. At the same time,
international law simply cannot be a guarantor of ruptured social contracts in
developing countries. A "strong" theory of empirical legitimacy, stemming
from international legal requirements, is therefore not a viable option.
The weak notion of empirical legitimacy proceeds from an assumption
about human behavior made by the legal perspective. The legal theory
assumes that if citizens participate in selecting their government, and are given
opportunities to influence policy once the government is in power, they will
perceive a congruence between their interests and those of the government. 3 '
By virtue of this congruence, States have assumed that a legally legitimate
government in international law will be one-to borrow Thomas Franck's
phrase used in another context-that exerts "a pull towards compliance."' 32
That is, citizens are more likely to feel an affinity toward a regime believed
to have emanated from a legitimate political process. This is a "weak theory"
of empirical legitimacy because it asserts only that, all other things being
equal, legally legitimate regimes are likely to secure the adherence of their
citizens more readily than legally illegitimate regimes.' It does not assert
that they will do so, since any number of events may cause citizens to become
disillusioned with such a government.
The weak theory of empirical legitimacy can be seen at work in the
agreements settling the Guatemalan civil war. 34 The framework "Agreement
131. This is, of course, the essence of social contract theory.
132. FRANCK, supra note 7, at 16.
133. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has described this consequence of democratization in much
stronger terms, though the tools his organization has at its disposal relate almost solely to the creation of
legal structures. See The Causes of Conflict, supra note 95.
134. Guatemala-UNIDAD RevolucionariaNacional Guatemalteca: Agreement on a Firm and Lasting
Peace, and the 10 Integral Agreements Covering Human Rights, Resettlement, Human Rights Violations,
Indigenous Peoples, Social and Economic Issues, Civilian Power and the Armed Forces, Definitive Cease-
fire, Constitutional and Electoral Reforms, the Legal Integration of URNG and Implementation, Compliance
and Verification, Dec. 29, 1996,36 I.L.M. 258 [hereinafter Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace]. The
international community was a pervasive presence at the accords. The peace talks were mediated by the
UN, UN officials signed each of the I I agreements that made up the settlement, and the Security Council
agreed to create the United Nations Verification Mission for Guatemala, which would supervise its
implementation. See U.N., United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: United Nations Verification
Mission in Guatemala, (visited Oct. 30, 1999) <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/minugua.htm>
(describing tasks of the mission to Guatemala).
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on a Firm and Lasting Peace" contains a straightforward statement of the legal
legitimacy principle: "Elections are essential for Guatemala's current
transition to a functional, participatory democracy. Improving the electoral
regime will help to strengthen the legitimacy of public authority."'35 In
addition, the agreements describe participatory democracy as essential to
healing the fragmentation of Guatemalan society and fostering a sense of
affinity between Guatemalan citizens and their government. This passage is
worth quoting at length:
Peace rests upon democratization and the creation of
structures and practices which will, in the future, prevent
political exclusion, ideological intolerance and the
polarization of Guatemalan society.
It is essential to overcome the deficiencies and weaknesses in
civil institutions, which are frequently inaccessible to most of
the population, and the prevalence of patterns of thought and
behaviour that have been detrimental to the rights and
freedoms of citizens....
Together with the agreements already signed, this Agreement
seeks to create the conditions for genuine reconciliation
among the people of Guatemala, based upon respect for
human rights and the diversity of its people and on their
shared determination to overcome the lack of social,
economic and political opportunities, which undermines
democratic coexistence and restricts the development of the
nation.
The implementation of this Agreement will benefit the whole
population, consolidate the governance of the country and
enhance the legitimacy of its democratic institutions in the
interest of the people of Guatemala."36
Weak as it is, even this assertion of empirical legitimacy is often
challenged. One common claim is that popularly legitimated government will
135. Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace, supra note 134, art. 13, 36 I.L.M., at 274.
136. Id. at 304-05.
1999]
68 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 7:35
actually increase citizen alienation from the State by exacerbating existing
ethnic cleavages. This is a complex subject that I cannot address fully here;
however, several points can be made briefly. First, the fact of ethnic conflict
must be distinguished from ethnic conflict resulting directly from liberalizing
political processes. At least in Africa, "[t]he endemic civil strife following
communal lines in polities such as Sudan and Somalia is entirely unrelated to
democratic process."' a Indeed, ethnic violence has often been most acute in
those States in which leaders resist political liberalization on the grounds that
it would exacerbate ethnic conflict.
Second, more moderate goals than the wholesale elimination of ethnic
conflict may be sufficient to allow pluralistic systems to function. Identity
politics is a staple of campaigns in Western States; no ambitious politician (in
the United States, in particular) would wholly ignore the interests of racial,
ethnic, and religious voting blocs. The crucial difference is that these interests
are not all-consuming to voters or wholly defining of who is in and who is out
of power. As Harvey Glickman notes, "[e]thnic conflict is not incompatible
with institutions of democratic government, when its expression is limited to
a group interest among other interests, and if the means of expression provide
openings to share rewards in a predictable manner."'38 There are various ways
in which electoral and regulatory institutions can be structured in order to
minimize the role played by ethnic identity. As two other commentators
argue, "[t]he rules of the political game can be structured to offer incentives
for moderation on divisive ethnic themes, to contain the destructive
tendencies, and to preempt the centrifugal thrust created by ethnic politics."'39
Third, one must return to the fundamental crisis prompting a concern with
empirically weak States and ask for a plausible alternative. Given the
permanency of existing borders and the inadmissibility ofassimilation through
coercion, how else can diversity be accommodated? Crawford Young
suggests that the alternatives are unsatisfactory: "[a]ccumulated experience
in many world regions suggests that cultural pluralism needs to be
acknowledged rather than ignored, through arrangements that induce
137. Crawford Young, The Third Wave of Democratization in Africa: Ambiguities and Contradictions,
in STATE, CONFLICT AND DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA, supra note 5 I, at 15, 29.
138. Harvey Glickman, Ethnicity. Elections and Constitutional Democracy in Africa, in ELECTIONS
AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA 37,39 (Timothy D. Sisk & Andrew Reynolds eds., 1998).
139. Andrew Reynolds & Timothy D. Sisk, Elections and Electoral Systems: Implicationsfor Conflict
Management, in ELECTIONS AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA, supra note 138, at 18.
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inclusionary politics and create structural incentives for intercommunal
cooperation."'40
The legal theory of legitimacy, as applied to the developing world, is also
empirically weak in that it lacks a foundation in community experience.14' As
noted earlier, in the developing world,juridical and empirical States arose (if
at all) at separate times and through separate processes. Governments in these
States cannot appeal to a common ethnicity, language, religion, etc. as a means
of securing a sense of affiliation to the State. What remains is an affiliation
defined by the institutions of government, flowing both from those
institutions' stated goals of openness and inclusiveness and from the sense of
common purpose that attends citizen participation in acts of collective
decisionmaking. This form of affiliation has variously been labeled
"civic identity" and "liberal nationalism."'" It suffers from the obvious
disadvantage of being essentially ahistorical. As Habermas points out, in
Europe people spread over large territories came to feel "responsible for one
another" only after "the awareness of a national identity crystallized around
a common history, language and culture."'43 But if this form of affiliation
appears to be little more than a legal construct, it must be remembered that
many developing States are themselves legal constructs. If international law
foreclosed the option of creating new, more "historically determined" States,
then we can hardly expect existing heterogeneous States to provide
historically conditioned notions of citizenship and affinity.
IV
The fourth proposition is that new international regulatory regimes have
incorporated requirements of popular participation, transparent
decisionmaking, and the free flow of information as essential components of
their normative schemes. Chayes and Chayes have defined regulatory regimes
as those addressing "complex economic, political and social problems that
140. Young, supra note 137, at 32.
141. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Separation Anxiety: International Responses to Ethno-Separatist
Claims, 23 YALEJ. INT'L L. 1, 18-19 (1998). Orentlicher's insightful article touches on many ofthe themes
raised in this Essay.
142. See generally YAEL TAMIR, LIBERAL NATIONALISM (1993); Charles A. Kupchan, Introduction:
Nationalism Resurgent, in NATIONALISM AND NATIONALITIES IN THE NEW EUROPE 1, 4-5 (Charles A.
Kupchan ed., 1995); Peter J. Spiro, The Citizenship Dilemma, 51 STAN. L. REV. 597 (1999) (critiquing
civic notion of citizenship in the United States).
143. Habermas, supra note 25, at 130.
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require cooperative action among states over time.""' While these are not
direct efforts to strengthen the empirical State, they make an important and
independent contribution. Each of these regimes holds out the promise of
benefits to State parties. Tangible incentives are thus created, in the form of
normative entitlements, for States to ensure the inclusiveness.of their political
institutions. Three prominent examples are environmental protection, the
rights of indigenous peoples, and efforts to combat official corruption.
Public participation in environmental matters is certainly not a new
concept. Most environmental movements in the developed world began with
grassroots movements gaining sufficient power to influence policymakers. In
Europe, for example, issues of environment emerged on national agendas with
the rise of Green parties. In the United States, important doctrines of
environmental law are made through the vehicle of "citizen suits." Many of
the demands made by these citizen groups involve calls for greater openness,
such as governmental disclosure of environmental hazards, and regular
opportunities for public comment on environmentally sensitive matters.
Multilateral initiatives have been infused with the same imperative of
participation. 4  The 1992 Rio Declaration states the matter directly:
"Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned
citizens, at the relevant level."' 46  Accordingly, many environmental
instruments require State Parties to issue environmental impact assessments,
provide transparency in decisionmaking, and allow public access to relevant
information.'47 The Economic Commission for Europe has adopted a
convention devoted solely to public participation in environmental matters'""
The convention states in its preamble that in order to achieve a healthy
environment, "citizens must have access to information, be entitled to
participate in decision-making and have access to justice in environmental
matters."'
149
144. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 3, at I (identifying the chief areas of concern for such regimes as
"trade, monetary policy, resource management, security, environmental degradation, and human rights").
145. See Jonas Ebbesson, The Notion of Public Participation in International Environmental Law, 8
Y. B.INT'L ENVTL. L. 51,87-94 (1997); Neil A.F. Popovid, The Right to Participate in Decisions that Affect
the Environment, 10 PACE ENV. L. REV. 683 (1993).
146. U.N. GAOR Preparatory Comm. for U.N. Conf. on Env't & Dev., 4th Sess., Agenda Item 3,
Principle 10, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/PC/WG.IlI/L.33/REV.l (1992).
147. These instruments are described in detail in Ebbesson, supra note 145.
148. U.N. ESCOR, Convention On Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making
andAccess to Justice in Environmental Matters, U.N. Doc. E/ECE/1366. U.N. Sales No. E/F/R.98. 11.E.27
(1999).
149. Id.
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The second regime, concerning the rights of indigenous peoples, is not
commonly understood as addressing governmental processes at the national
level. Indigenous peoples and groups have more often stressed the need for
local autonomy in matters of concern to their communities.'5 ° But given that
national governments make important decisions affecting indigenous
communities, and that "representation of indigenous peoples [at the State
level] remains inadequate and is sometimes purely symbolic,"'"' enhanced
participation nationally is also essential if rights are to be protected. Thus, the
Sub-Commission's Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
provides in Article 19 that: "Indigenous peoples have the right to participate
fully, if they so choose, at all levels of decision-making in matter which may
affect their rights, lives and destinies.""' Rights to participation can also
assist indigenous peoples in making otherwise apathetic publics aware of their
plight. As Mary Ellen Turpel argues, "[w]ithout enormous resources to wage
lobby efforts, media campaigns, and education initiatives, some direct access
to the state apparatus is required to get public attention and to mobilize
opinion effectively."'53
The third example is the recent multilateral effort to combat official
corruption. An evident link exists between political institutions closed from
public scrutiny and the opportunity for corrupt activities. For this reason, anti-
corruption initiatives have stressed the interplay between political democracy
and the exposure (and deterrence) of corrupt acts. The Inter-American
Convention Against Corruption states in its preamble that "representative
democracy . . .requires, by its nature, the combating of every form of
corruption in the performance of public functions."'" Similarly, the UN
General Assembly, in an International Code of Conduct for Public Officials,
150. See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 109-11 (1996).
15 I. Id. at 123 n. 121 (quoting U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities, Study of the Problem of Discrimination on Indigenous Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1986/7, Add. 4, para. 261 (1986)).
152. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56, at 105
(1994). See also Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, art.
6.1(b), ILO Convention No. 69, September 5, 1991, reprinted in 3 ILO, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 1977-1995, at 324-26 (1996) (Governments "must establish
means by which these peoples can freely participate, to at least the same extent as other sectors of the
population, at all levels of decision-making in elective institutions and administrative and other bodies
responsible for policies and programmes which concern them.").
153. Mary Ellen Turpel, Indigenous Peoples 'Right of Political Participation and SeIf-determination:
Recent International Legal Developments and the Continuing Strugglefor Recognition, 25 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 579, 593 (1992).
154. Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (visited Nov.
29, 1999) <http://www.OAS.org/EN/PROG/Juridico/englishfTreatieslb-58.html>.
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stressed the importance of public accountability in countering the self-interest
of the corrupt official: "the ultimate loyalty of public officials shall be to the
public interests of their country as expressed through the democratic
institutions of government."'' 55
V
The fifth and final proposition is that strengthening the empirical State in
the developing world is essential to the continued vitality ofjuridical equality
among States. I have already noted how the principle of juridical equality is
undermined by the very different empirical origins of developed and
developing States.'56 Because empirical cohesion was an assumption of
juridical Statehood, this inequality is different from the standard claim of
inequality based on size or disparity in resources. It is, instead, an inequality
of capacity to function as a coherent political unit in relation to international
law. That is, the capacity to perform the minimal obligations of Statehood
that are essential to a community of States).
This type of inequality might be altered in two ways: by changes in the
empirical strength of States or by changes in the demands international law
places upon States. I have already discussed the former. The fifth proposition
concerns the latter. It contends that recent multilateral regimes have assumed
a drastically increased capacity to implement international norms.'57 The new
regimes make demands on every domestic institution and political process.
They require efficient legislative bodies capable of enacting appropriate
implementing legislation, effective regulatory agencies, and judicial systems
that will respond decisively to alleged violations of international standards.
Even a State endowed with sufficient resources, but without a government
commanding a sense of legitimacy among its citizens, will be unable to serve
as a conduit for the realization of international normative goals. Weak
empirical States have difficulty enforcing their own laws, let alone
international obligations. This may be because the institutions of government
simply do not function in many areas of the country;'58 because laws routinely
155. G.A. Res. 51/59 (June 28, 1997) (Annex).
156. See supra notes 15-63 and accompanying text.
157. A quantitative aspect to these developments is also evident: there is simply more international law
to implement now. In 1956, just before the majority of developing States achieved independence, there
were 132 inter-governmental organizations in the world. In 1998 the number had increased to 4414. I
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 1764 (Union of International Associations ed., 1999).
158. See, e.g., Jeffrey Herbst, Responding to State Failure in Africa, INT'L SEC., Winter 1996-97, at
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under- or unenforced have come to be seen as so many "pieces of paper;" or
because unaccountable leaders divert public resources for their own use.'59
Whatever the specific cause, where "a sense of nationhood is only weakly
developed ... its absence will be revealed in the degree of loyalty the state
can command when under pressure."'" This aspect of empirical weakness
stands apart from the question of resources.
There are numerous examples of the heightened demands international
law places on domestic institutions. In the area of environmental protection,
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and
Flora requires States to designate four separate management authorities to
oversee trade in the species listed in various appendices.' 6 ' Among other
things, these authorities are charged with issuing species export permits
(subject to a list of specified conditions) and determining the validity of
exceptions.'62 The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer requires the reduction of certain ozone-depleting substances by
specified dates, the achievement of which is to be measured by data
accumulated by State Parties themselves. 63 The Convention on Biodiversity
requires States to develop national strategies to conserve biodiversity,
including in situ conservation measures and the promotion of public
awareness of biodiversity. '" And the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal
specifically requires implementing action at the State level, including the
designation of a focal point for implementation, the enactment of
implementing legislation, and the dissemination to the Convention Secretariat
of information regarding Convention-related events. 6 '
120, 123 (noting that in many African States "[e]ven the most basic agents of the state-agricultural
extension agents, tax collectors, census takers-are no longer to be found in many rural areas. As a result,
some states are increasingly unable to exercise physical control over their territories").
159. In Nigeria, for example, a state rich in natural resources, a regime that jailed the winner of
multiparty elections engaged in corruption on a scale that left the government literally bereft of capital.
"Most of Nigeria's revenue was paid into private bank accounts before the return to democracy, and senior
members of successive military administrations amassed fortunes amounting to billions of dollars." BBC
News, Nigeria Purges Military, (June 10, 1999) <http://news2.thls.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/
newsid%5 F365000/365497.stm>.
160. BEETHAM, supra note 28, at 133.
161. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 2, 1973,
art. 111, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
162. Id. art. IV.
163. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, arts. 2 & 3, 26
I.L.M. 1550 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989).
164. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, arts. 7, 8, & 13, 31 I.L.M. 818, 819.
165. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
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Innovations in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the World
Trade Organization (GATT/WTO) regime require open and efficient
regulatory institutions. One example is the Uruguay Round's Agreement on
Import Licensing Procedures, which requires States to publish information
sufficient to make clear the basis on which import licenses are granted.'66
Changes in licensing procedures must also be made public. 6 ' As Jeremy
Rosen argues, "[t]ransparency is important because if the rules are not clearly
stated and available, foreign traders would be at a serious disadvantage
because they would not know how to comply with local rules, and therefore
might not be able to secure a license."' 68 Another example is the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,'69 which for many
developing States will require the creation of an entirely new legal regime to
protect intellectual property. 7 "
A third example is the complex of undertakings that comes with claiming
an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) under the UN Law of the Sea
Convention. 7 ' These include establishing laws and regulations governing
access by foreign nationals,'72 devising conservation measures for the living
resources of the EEZ,"' and policing the EEZ against unauthorized foreign
intrusion.'74 A combination of factors, including scarce resources, "have made
it very difficult, particularly for small developing countries, to turn their newly
acquired legal authority into the economic benefits they had sought to gain
from the EEZ regime."'7
A fourth example is the various conventions on international judicial
assistance drafted by the Hague Conference on Private International Law.'76
Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, arts. 4(4)&(7), 5, & 13(3)(e-h), 28 I.LM. 657-70.
166. Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, Annex IA, art. 1(4)(a), reprinted in I LAW AND
PRACTICE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 261, 262 (Joseph F. Dennin ed., 1996).
167. Id. art. 5.
168. Jeremy Brooks Rosen, China, Emerging Economies, and the World Trade Order, 46 DUKE L.J.
1519, 1533 (1997).
169. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, in Agreement on Import
Licensing Procedures, supra note 166, Annex IC.
170. See Michelle Gravelle & John Whalley, Africa and the Uruguay Round, 6 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 123, 131 (1996).
171. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, part V, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3,418.
172. Id. art. 62(4).
173. Id. art. 61.
174. Id. art. 73.
175. M. Johanne Picard, Note, International Law of Fisheries and Small Developing Slates: A Call
for the Recognition of Regional Hegemony, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 317, 322 (1996).
176. For a description of the Hague Conference, see GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION
IN UNITED STATES COURTS 796-97 (3rd ed. 1996).
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The Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters requires State Parties to designate
a "central authority" which arranges to have documents served in its territory,
and prepares certificates to show that service occurred.'" The Convention on
the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters requires State
judicial authorities to execute document requests expeditiously from other
contracting parties and to apply appropriate measures of compulsion in order
to obtain requested documents.""8 In addition, the Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction requires its "central authorities" to
perform a wide range of administrative tasks, from discovering the
whereabouts of an abducted child, to securing the voluntary return of the
child, to providing legal advice where appropriate. 79
A final example involves the organizations overseeing regional economic
integration in the developing world. Teshome Mulat counts eleven major
African regional and sub-regional economic communities in 1998, with many
other smaller organizations having the potential to evolve into economic
communities."8 With few exceptions, these organizations have failed to
advance the cause of economic cooperation. Much of the problem lies not in
the integration schemes themselves, but in the national institutions of their
Member States. As R. Kenneth Kiplagat observes, "the institutional, political,
and legal arrangements within developing countries have been weak, and this
weakness has permeated their interstate dealings."' 8 '
CONCLUSION
This Essay has asked whether international law is working to marginalize
the State in the developing world. While a variety of global trends might
appear to make this so, a crisis of empirical governance has in fact led States
to pursue the opposite goal in international law. The empirical State has
always been a marginal presence in the developing world. However, this
177. Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or
Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, arts. 5 & 6, 658 U.N.T.S. 163, 166.
178. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, Mar. 18, 1970,
arts. 9 & 10, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444.
179. Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25. 1980, art. 7, 19 I.L.M.
1501, 1502.
180. See Teshome Mulat, Multilateralism and Africa 'a Regional Economic Communities, 32 J.
WORLD TRADE 115, 117 (1998).
181. P. Kenneth Kiplagat, An Institutional and Structural Modelfor Successful Economic Integration
in Developing Countries, 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 39, 50 (1994).
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weakness has become a subject of regulation in international law because of
the increasing demand multilateral regimes impose on national institutions of
government. These demands range from implementing sophisticated trade and
environmental regimes, to respecting human rights, to combating corruption,
and to granting indigenous peoples a voice in national government. In
addition, international organizations, freed from the paralysis of the Cold War,
have become deeply involved in settling internal conflicts that disrupt the
process of governance, sometimes to the point of total breakdown. In short,
the international community has a range of interests to be furthered by
strengthening empirical Statehood in the developing world.
This imperative is reinforced by the lack of alternative means to promote
effective governance. European States benefitted from an international law
that ratified the borders of political communities emerging from centuries of
reconfiguration and consolidation. Modern conceptions of the State had their
origins in this process, and so assumed a coincidence between empirical and
juridical Statehood. States in the developing world are often characterized by
the absence of such a coincidence. Yet, international law contains rules that
deny developing States and peoples the possibility of taking drastic action to
bring themselves in line with the European model. A right to secession, which
would have acknowledged the contingent nature of borders largely drawn by
colonial authorities, has been decisively rejected. Discretion to homogenize
populations within existing borders, to accord with the linguistic, religious,
cultural, or other preferences of the dominant group, has also been decisively
rejected by the international law of human rights. Permitting either of these
courses of action would have acknowledged that European assumptions of
empirical Statehood simply could not be transferred to the developing world.
But the majority of States have been unwilling to relinquish that assumption
in international law. States have largely taken an extraordinarily conservative
position by, in effect, adopting a normative freeze on current borders and
national demographic profiles. In international law, heterogeneous States with
little common history are here to stay.
The only option, then, is to focus on the governing institutions of existing
States. If heterogeneity has been the problem, then inclusiveness must be the
guiding principle of a normative solution. Initiatives to foster transitions to
democracy, respect for minority rights, the creation of civil societies, and
transparent regulatory processes all work to legitimize government in the eyes
of citizens with little sense of affinity to the State that the government
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represents. It is hoped that enhancing a regime's legitimacy will also enhance
its capacity for effective governance.
This "weak" theory of empirical legitimacy is the link between these
efforts and more effective implementation of international regulatory norms.
At present, there is a radical disjunction between the regulatory actions called
for by recent multilateral treaty regimes and the capacities of regulatory
authorities in developing States. This raises the specter of inequalities
between the developed and developing worlds expanding with the creation of
each new multilateral treaty regime. While inclusive and legitimate
government cannot itself prevent this from occurring-many other problems,
first and foremost the lack of resources, must also be overcome-it is a
necessary step. If legitimate government is generally acknowledged as
essential to effective implementation of complex domestic law, it is no less
essential to enforcement of multilateral regimes of the same kind.
Despite a host of new actors appearing on the international scene in recent
years, "states are and must remain the overwhelmingly important subjects of
international law."'8 2 The effective function of States cannot help but
implicate every aspect of the international legal process. Efforts to strengthen
developing States recognize the substantial cost and fundamental inequity of
allowing an entire sector of States to continue to be marginal players in the
international legal system. For those States, continued empirical weakness
portends nothing less than the further marginalization of international law
itself.
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